These lectures, delivered as part of the 1962 St. Augustine Lecture Series at Villanova University, develop the Thomistic conception of man as an "intellectual soul" which itself is both a self-subsisting substance and a substantial form. So viewed, man's unity consists in being a composite reality, not in the sense of a soul and a body functioning as co-parts of a whole, but in the sense of an intelligible substance which requires an organic body to realize its own nature. The (...) lectures neither criticize nor explicitly defend these claims but rather present them as a novel interpretation of man. This Aquinas was able to construct by drawing the conceptual tools of form, matter and substance from Aristotelian metaphysics and the view of man as an historical pilgrim from Augustinian theology.--B. G. R. (shrink)

A stimulating, detailed study of a most important aspect of Peirce's pragmaticism. In developing the "problem of universals" as it arises in the writings of Peirce, Boler presents the most informative analysis yet to appear of Peirce's indebtedness to the realist-nominalist controversy of the school-men. The author, taking seriously Peirce's characterization of himself as a "Scotistic Realist," uses Scotus as a model for constructing a systematic interpretation of Peirce's realism. In stressing Peirce's dependence upon, as well as divergence from, Scotus, (...) Boler provides a context in which realist, pragmatic, and idealist strands in Peirce's thought emerge, not as incompatible emphases, but as interdependent responses to different aspects of the "problem of universals." The author introduces a vast array of well-known Peircian themes and explicates their relation to Peirce's realism and to one another. The present study is excitingly developed and well worth the reader's serious attention.--B. G. R. (shrink)

Disagreeing with many students of American philosophy who have interpreted Chauncey Wright as foreshadowing basic elements in the pragmatisms of Peirce, James and Dewey, Madden contends that the characteristic elements of Wright's thought are neither peculiar to pragmatism nor anticipations of its basic tenets. After an introductory biography of Wright's short, often lonely, tragic life, Madden presents a penetrating analysis of Wright's more important essays dealing with many currently debated problems in the philosophy of religion, moral philosophy, philosophy of science (...) and cosmology, epistemology, metaphysics, and psychology. The case for Wright's "philosophical independence" seems to be based on Madden's neglect of important nuances within pragmatism itself.--B. G. R. (shrink)

More than a decade after Philip P. Wiener and Frederick H. Young edited the first volume of Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce, Moore and Robin have brought together a collection of essays which serves as a valuable supplement to that earlier publication. It is more than a supplement, however; it can stand on its own as a significant contribution to Peirce scholarship. Continuity with the first volume is achieved through new essays which analyze Peirce's theory of belief, (...) of habit, and of Scotistic realism—themes about which many of the earlier papers revolved. Novelty is achieved through increased emphasis on Peirce's logical and mathematical writings and on the influence of nineteenth century evolutionism upon Peirce's pragmaticism. The exploration of the latter motif in the three contributions of W. Donald Oliver, Rulon Wells, and Thomas A. Goudge is particularly noteworthy. In their Preface, Moore and Robin state that the most significant contribution of this new volume is the revelation of the extent to which Peirce was first a scientist and then a philosopher. This is a misleading characterization of the book. True, Victor F. Lenzen's "Charles S. Peirce As Astronomer" is an engaging piece. On the other hand, the bulk of the articles impress the reader with the originality and modernity of Peirce, the philosopher and Peirce, the logician. The most notable feature of this collection is the number of essays which draw parallels between dominant philosophical and logical themes found in Peirce's writings and major interests of mid-twentieth century philosophers. Impressive examples are: A. R. Turquette's "Peirce's Icons For Deductive Logic," Richard M. Martin's "On Acting On A Belief," Larry Holmes's "Prolegomena To Peirce's Philosophy Of Mind," and Richard J. Bernstein's "Peirce's Theory of Perception." In presenting the articles which constitute this volume the editors give evidence not only of the relevance of Peirce for the contemporary student of philosophy but also of the impetus which Peirce's thought has provided for creative philosophical analysis. An additional bonus for Peirce scholars are two bibliographies prepared by Max H. Fisch. One is a supplement to Arthur W. Burk's 1958 bibliography of works by C. S. Peirce. The other is a draft of a bibliography of works about C. S. Peirce.—B. G. R. (shrink)

Peirce's theory of belief and doubt, his theory of meaning, and his theory of truth and reality serve as the point of departure for a study of his Pragmatism. What the present essay lacks in freshness of approach is partly offset by an interesting defense of the essential unity of Peirce's thought. By imaginatively interpreting the above theories in their early formulations Wennerberg is able to argue for a continuity with later formulations as they appeared in essays written after 1890. (...) The chapter on "Peirce's Theory of Belief and Doubt" is particularly successful in this respect. For the most part Wennerberg's own criticisms of Peirce are much less forceful than his defenses.--B. G. R. (shrink)

A spirited critique of what Tsanoff believes to be two misguided themes in much of Western thought: cosmologies which take substances and things, rather than processes and actions, as basic, and the tendency to reduce the multiple dimensions of reality to one particular perspective. The contention is advanced that in assuming substances to be primary, philosophers have brought upon themselves the vexing problems involved in a world view that distinguishes sharply between minds and bodies. Tsanoff suggests that the problem of (...) relating minds and bodies can be solved only by viewing reality, not substantivally, but as complexes of events in the dynamic system of nature. He concludes that only a dramatic view, that is, one in which numerous forces and perspectives are seen in their interrelation, is adequate to capture the novelty and richness of reality.--B. G. R. (shrink)